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We used population-based data to evaluate how often groups of randomly selected clinical laboratories
accurately estimated the prevalence of resistant pneumococci and captured trends in resistance over time.
Surveillance for invasive pneumococcal disease was conducted in eight states from 1996 to 1998. Within
each surveillance area, we evaluated the proportion of all groups of three, four, and five laboratories that
estimated the prevalence of penicillin-nonsusceptible pneumococci (%PNSP) and the change in %PNSP
over time. We assessed whether sentinel groups detected emerging fluoroquinolone resistance. Groups of
five performed best. Sentinel groups accurately predicted %PNSP in five states; states where they per-
formed poorly had high between-laboratory variation in %PNSP. Sentinel groups detected large changes
in prevalence of nonsusceptibility over time but rarely detected emerging fluoroquinolone resistance. Char-
acteristics of hospital-affiliated laboratories were not useful predictors of a laboratory’s %PNSP. Sentinel
surveillance for resistant pneumococci can detect important trends over time but rarely detects newly
emerging resistance profiles. 
ntibiotic-resistant infections are an emerging problem in
community as well as nosocomial settings. Streptococcus
pneumoniae  infections are a leading cause of community-
acquired respiratory illness in young children, the elderly, and
persons with chronic medical conditions. Pneumococcal infec-
tions range from otitis media and bacteremia to pneumonia
and meningitis. Although penicillin has traditionally been an
effective treatment for pneumococcal infections, in recent
years the increasing prevalence of drug-resistant pneumococci
threatens the effectiveness of antibiotic therapy (1,2).
Surveillance for resistant pneumococci is an essential com-
ponent of public health efforts to prevent the spread of drug
resistance. In addition to increasing awareness of the public
and health-care providers about resistance, surveillance data
can be used to target high-prevalence areas for judicious use of
antibiotics, pneumococcal vaccination campaigns, or both;
identify newly emerging strains and resistance profiles; and
assess trends in resistance. At the national level, surveillance
data can contribute to the development of clinical guidelines
for managing pneumococcal disease (3,4). Local surveillance
data can in some instances guide patient care (4).
The prevalence of drug-resistant pneumococci varies geo-
graphically. Because national trends may not reflect trends
within specific regions, local and state-specific data can moti-
vate prevention efforts (5). Although invasive disease due to
drug-resistant pneumococci was added to the National Notifi-
able Diseases List in 1994, mandatory reporting remains low
(53% of states and territories in 1999) (6), in part because col-
lecting antimicrobial susceptibility data can be difficult.
Active, population-based surveillance for resistant pneumo-
cocci based on laboratory-confirmed invasive disease may be
considered the most accurate method of estimating rates of
drug-resistant pneumococcal disease in a defined area. Such
systems, however, are often costly and labor-intensive for state
or local health departments to maintain.
Sentinel surveillance, a system that collects information on
drug-resistant pneumococci from a limited sample of hospital,
clinic, and/or private laboratories, has been suggested as a fea-
sible alternative method of collecting regional data, and some
states are adopting this approach (7). Although sentinel sys-
tems are useful for monitoring trends in a number of diseases
(8-10) and a sentinel hospital surveillance system in the 1980s
first detected increases in the prevalence of penicillin-resistant
pneumococci in the United States (11), observations that the
prevalence of resistant pneumococcal isolates can vary dra-
matically from laboratory to laboratory within a state or area
(12) raise the question of whether sentinel laboratories can
accurately reflect an area’s prevalence of pneumococcal
resistance.
For pneumococcus, the most common approach to sentinel
surveillance is to select a small number of clinical laboratories
within an area and collect information on susceptibility of all
invasive pneumococcal isolates at those facilities as a way of
estimating the prevalence of resistance in the area as a whole.
To evaluate the validity of this sentinel approach, we assessed
how often small groups of laboratories in a given area accu-
rately estimated the area’s proportion of resistant invasive
pneumococcal isolates, using population-based surveillance as
the standard. We also evaluated whether such sentinel groups
of laboratories accurately tracked changes in the proportion of
drug-resistant pneumococci over time, and whether they could
detect newly emerging resistance profiles. Finally, we *Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
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explored whether hospital characteristics could be used to
guide selection of hospital laboratories for inclusion in sentinel




Invasive pneumococcal surveillance was conducted from
1996 to 1998 as part of the Active Bacterial Core Surveillance/
Emerging Infections Program Network (ABCs) using previ-
ously described methods (1). Briefly, project personnel com-
municated at least twice each month with contacts in all
participating microbiology laboratories serving acute-care
hospitals in San Francisco County, California; Connecticut;
eight counties in Georgia (Cobb, Clayton, De Kalb, Douglas,
Fulton, Gwinnett, Newton, and Rockdale) with 12 additional
Atlanta-area counties starting in 1997; six counties in Mary-
land (Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Baltimore City, Carroll, Har-
ford, and Howard); seven counties in Minnesota (Anoka,
Carver, Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey, Scott, and Washington);
seven counties in New York starting in 1997 (Genesee, Living-
ston, Monroe, Ontario, Orleans, Wayne, and Yates); three
counties in Oregon (Clackamas, Multnomah, and Washing-
ton); and five counties in Tennessee (Davidson, Hamilton,
Knox, Shelby, and Williamson).
A case was defined as the isolation of Streptococcus pneu-
moniae from a normally sterile site (e.g., blood or cerebrospi-
nal fluid) from a resident of a surveillance area. Periodic audits
were conducted in each area. Any cases newly identified by
audits were included in the surveillance database.
All isolates were sent to one of two centralized laboratories
for susceptibility testing by broth microdilution, with a panel
of drugs that included (in 1998) penicillin, amoxicillin, cefo-
taxime, cefuroxime, meropenem, erythromycin, clindamycin,
chloramphenicol, vancomycin, rifampin, levofloxacin, trova-
floxacin, and quinupristin-dalfopristin (Synercid7). Nonsus-
ceptibility (resistance and intermediate susceptibility) was
determined according to criteria of the National Committee for
Clinical Laboratory Standards (13).
Ability of Sentinel Laboratory Groups 
To Estimate Proportion of Resistant Isolates
In each surveillance area for 1998, we generated all possi-
ble simple random samples of three, four, and five laborato-
ries, excluding laboratories with <10 isolates. We limited our
selection to up to five laboratories because a central objective
of sentinel surveillance is to reduce required resources by
reducing the number of facilities participating in the surveil-
lance system. We refer to these simple random samples as sen-
tinel groups of laboratories. We then calculated the percent of
penicillin-nonsusceptible (MIC >0.1 µg/mL) pneumococci
(%PNSP) among isolates in each of these sentinel groups and
compared these percentages to the area’s actual %PNSP, as
measured by ABCs. The %PNSP in sentinel groups was con-
sidered to be accurate if it was within 5 percentage points of
the area’s actual %PNSP. We chose this interval because varia-
tion in the %PNSP within this range is unlikely to influence
public health decisions (12).
We used a finite population correction based on the total
number of isolates in each surveillance area to assess the num-
ber of randomly sampled isolates that would be needed to esti-
mate an area’s actual %PNSP within 5 percentage points (14).
We compared that number with the number of isolates in senti-
nel groups in each area.
Ability of Sentinel Groups To Track Changes in Prevalence
of Drug-Resistant Pneumococci over Time
In each surveillance area, we subtracted the %PNSP in
each possible group of five laboratories in 1996 from that mea-
sured for the group of five laboratories in 1998. We included
only laboratories with >10 isolates in each of the 2-year peri-
ods. We then measured how often the change in %PNSP in
sentinel groups was within 5 percentage points of the area’s
actual change in %PNSP during the same time periods, based
on ABCs data. We performed a similar analysis using the per-
centage of erythromycin-nonsusceptible (MIC >0.5 µg/mL)
isolates as the outcome measure.
Ability of Sentinel Goups To Detect 
Emerging Fluoroquinolone Resistance
Using data from 1998, we measured the proportion of all
possible groups of five sentinel laboratories within each sur-
veillance area that captured any pneumococcal isolates with
fluoroquinolone (levofloxacin or trovafloxacin) nonsuscepti-
bility. We then compared that proportion with area-specific
data on the presence of pneumococcal fluoroquinolone resis-
tance from ABCs in 1998.
Evaluation of Hospital Predictors of %PNSP
We merged ABCs data from 1997 and 1998 with pur-
chased data on hospital characteristics collected by the Ameri-
can Hospital Association (AHA) as part of the AHA Annual
Survey of Registered American Hospitals in 1997. We catego-
rized each hospital that matched between the two datasets into
the following PNSP classes: >5 percentage points above the
surveillance area proportion PNSP (high PNSP), <5 percent-
age points above or below the surveillance area PNSP (aver-
age PNSP), or >5 percentage points below the surveillance
area PNSP (low PNSP). We used logistic regression to per-
form univariate analyses. We compared hospital characteris-
tics in the high group with those in the average group,
separately comparing hospital characteristics in the low group
with those in the average group. We categorized continuous
variables according to their quartiles or medians based on their
distributions. We limited our analysis to hospital characteris-
tics that might plausibly influence a hospital’s %PNSP based
on findings of previous studies (15,16).RESEARCH
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Results
Population-Based Data
The %PNSP across surveillance areas in 1998 varied from
15 (California and New York) to 35 (Tennessee) (Table 1). The
number of laboratories that isolated invasive pneumococci and
the total number of invasive pneumococcal isolates also varied
by surveillance area (Table 1). Consistent with previous obser-
vations (12), each surveillance area had striking variation
across laboratories in the %PNSP in invasive pneumococcal
isolates (Figure).
Ability of Sentinel Laboratory Groups To Estimate %PNSP
In New York, California, and Oregon (areas with a rela-
tively small number of laboratories with >10 invasive pneu-
mococcal isolates), sentinel groups of three, four, or five
laboratories all did well at estimating the area’s actual %PNSP
(Table 1). In the remaining areas, increasing the number of
laboratories included in sentinel groups from three to five
increased the probability that the sentinel %PNSP approached
the area’s actual %PNSP. However, in Georgia and Tennessee,
the two areas with the highest actual %PNSP, sentinel groups
of five laboratories still poorly estimated the area’s actual per-
centage (Table 1).
In surveillance areas where most sentinel groups had an
adequate sample size to estimate %PNSP accurately (i.e., the
number of isolates met the sample size requirement), sentinel
groups performed well compared with population-based sur-
veillance (Table 2). In contrast, in Georgia and Tennessee,
where sentinel groups performed poorly, a smaller proportion
of sentinel groups met the minimum sample size requirements.
However, in some states that failed to meet sample size require-
ments (e.g., Connecticut), sentinel groups performed well.
Ability of Sentinel Groups To Detect Trends 
in Prevalence of Nonsusceptible Pneumococci 
The actual change in %PNSP in 1998 compared with that
in 1996 varied across areas, ranging from Georgia’s 2%
decline to Maryland’s 7% increase (Table 3). Because sentinel
groups of five were the most accurate at predicting an area’s
actual %PNSP, we focused strictly on groups of five for this
analysis. Laboratories participating in ABCs in 1998 were
often not the same as those participating in 1996 because of
hospital or laboratory mergers, closing or opening of microbi-
ology facilities in the surveillance areas, and expansion of
areas under surveillance. Consequently, only a subset of all
possible sentinel groups in 1998 matched those in 1996.
Over two thirds of each area’s sentinel groups of five accu-
rately estimated changes in %PNSP, except in Tennessee, where
only 45% correctly estimated a <5 percentage point change
(Table 3). In the three areas with large changes in %PNSP (>3
percentage points), >90% of sentinel groups in each area pre-
dicted the direction of the change (increases in each case). 
Trends in the proportion of isolates that were erythromycin
nonsusceptible also varied by area, and three areas showed
large increases from 1996 to 1998 (Table 3). Similar to trends
observed for penicillin nonsusceptibility, sentinel groups had a
high probability of detecting these increases in erythromycin
nonsusceptibility (Table 3).
Ability of Sentinel Groups To Detect 
Emerging Fluoroquinolone Resistance
In 1998, seven isolates submitted to ABCs were nonsus-
ceptible to levofloxacin; five of these were also nonsusceptible
to trovafloxacin. The isolates came from seven different hospi-
tals, located in five of the eight surveillance areas (California,
Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, and Oregon). One of these
hospitals, the only hospital from Oregon, had only five inva-
sive pneumococcal isolates in 1998 and thus was excluded
from our analysis of sentinel groups. Approximately 40% of
sentinel groups of five laboratories in these areas (range 37%
in Connecticut to 45% in Maryland) included a laboratory with
a fluoroquinolone-nonsusceptible isolate, except in California,
where there was only one possible sentinel group of five labo-
ratories and this group included the fluoroquinolone-nonsus-
ceptible isolate.
Table 1. Ability of sentinel groups of three, four, and five laboratories to estimate accurately %PNSP, 1998a
 Area
Labs with >10 
isolates (total labs) Actual %PNSP Total isolates
% of sentinel groups within 5 percentage points of actual %PNSP
3 labs (no. of groups; 
overall range in %PNSP)
4 labs (no. of groups; 
overall range in %PNSP)
5 labs (no. of groups; 
overall range in %PNSP)
CA 5 (9) 15 181 100 (10; 12-17) 100 (5; 13-16) 100 (1; NA)
CT 25 (32) 18 681 73 (2,300; 2-31) 81 (12,650;4-30) 87 (53,130;6-30)
GA 18 (34) 33 860 45 (816; 19-51) 52 (3,060; 20-49) 58 (8,568; 21-48)
MD 20 (26) 22 579 60 (1,140; 8-40) 68 (4,845; 9-38) 74 (15,504; 10-37)
MN 12 (24) 20 470 78 (220; 11-30) 88 (495; 12-29) 94  (792; 14-28)
NY 5 (19) 15 191 80 (10; 9-15) 100 (5; 10-14) 100 (1; NA)
OR 6 (13) 21 228 80 (20; 14-25) 93 (15; 14-23) 100 (6; 17-21)
TN 20 (30) 35 419 37 (1,140; 11-62) 40 (4,845; 13-59) 44 (15,504;14-57)
aIn Active Bacterial Core surveillance areas.
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Evaluation of Hospital Predictors of %PNSP
The merged dataset of ABCs and AHA hospitals contained
104 hospitals: 24 (23%) were in the high PNSP category, 52
(50%) were in the average PNSP category; and 28 (27%) were
in the low PNSP category. Hospitals that admitted only chil-
dren (four hospitals that matched between the two datasets)
were significantly more likely to be in the high PNSP group
than in the average group (all four hospitals fell in the high cat-
egory; Fisher’s exact test, p=0.008). Larger hospitals (mea-
sured by adjusted inpatient days, total beds, or total beds set up
and staffed) were more likely to fall in the average category,
but this trend was not consistent for all indicators capturing
hospital size (Table 4). Additional variables tested by univari-
ate analysis were not predictive of falling in the high or low
category (Table 4). When we performed similar analyses
using the percent of erythromycin-nonsusceptible isolates or
of isolates with resistance to more than one drug class as the
primary outcome measure, no additional predictors were
identified.
In areas where sentinel surveillance did not accurately esti-
mate the %PSNP (Georgia and Tennessee), can hospital predic-
tors be used to improve performance? When we limited sentinel
groups of five to the laboratories with the largest number of iso-
lates, the range in %PNSP narrowed, but accuracy was not
guaranteed (range in Georgia 29%-34%; range in Tennessee
36%-44%). Additionally, consistent with the analysis above,
hand-picking sentinel hospitals to include those with a high pro-
portion of pediatric isolates was likely to overestimate the
actual %PNSP; in Georgia the children’s hospital had a %PNSP
of 61%, whereas the area’s true %PNSP was 33% (Table 1).
Table 2. Number of isolates required to estimate accurately %PNSP 






No. of isolates 
needed to esti-
mate %PNSPa
% of sentinel groups of 5 laborato-
ries with > no. of required isolates
CA 15 (10-20) 94 100
CT 18 (13-23) 172 3
GA 33 (28-38) 243 40
MD 22 (17-27) 183 12
MN 20 (15-25) 163 70
NY 15 (10-20) 97 100
OR 21 (16-26) 120 100
TN 35 (30-40) 191 0
a No. of isolates, n, required to estimate the area’s actual %PNSP (P) within 5 percent-
age points (d=0.05) with 95% confidence (Z=1.96) is: n= (Z2 P(1-P))/d2, where d is the 
range of accepted variation around the actual %PNSP, and Z is the Z-score range within 
which values must fall. Because the total no. of isolates per area, N, was small, we cor-
rected this estimate for finite population size: n=n/[1+(n-1)/N]. There is no power asso-
ciated with this estimate (14).
%PNSP, percent of penicillin-nonsusceptible pneumocooccal isolates.
Figure. Between-laboratory variation in percent penicillin-nonsusceptible isolates (%PNSP) and number of invasive pneumococcal isolates in
selected surveillance areas. A) Connecticut; B) Selected counties of Maryland; C) Selected counties of Tennessee. Solid line denotes the area’s
actual %PNSP from active, population-based surveillance.
Table 3. Ability of sentinel groups of five laboratories to estimate an 






in % NS 
pneumococci
% sentinel groups 
within 5 percentage 
points of the area’s 






decrease in the 
actual % NS 
pneumococcic
Penicillin NS CA +3 100 (1) 100
CT +1 67 (15,504)
GA -2 76 (2,002)
MD +7 70 (15,504) 93
MN +6 97 (252) 99
TN 0 45 (462)
Erythromycin 
NS
CA -2 100 (1)
CT +2 95 (15,504)
GA +6 80 (2,002) 86
MD +6 97 (15,504) 99
MN +7 83 (252) 99.6
TN +2.5 51 (462) --
a NY joined ABCs in 1997; the only group of 5 laboratories in OR in 1996 did not match 
any of the groups in 1998.
bGroups that merged between the 2 years.
cWe limited this analysis to areas with >3% change in either direction.
%PNSP, percent penicillin-nonsusceptible pneumococci; NS, nonsusceptible.RESEARCH
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Discussion
As the incidence of drug-resistant pneumococcal disease
continues to increase, the need for local and state-specific data
on the emergence of drug-resistant invasive pneumococcal
strains also grows. Although active, population-based surveil-
lance provides highly accurate data for tracking pneumococcal
resistance trends, few states can afford to implement such
labor-intensive and costly systems. Moreover, states may have
a variety of objectives for their surveillance systems, ranging
from increasing awareness of resistance in local communities
and promoting appropriate antibiotic use activities to estimat-
ing directly the drug-resistant isolates and trends in drug resis-
tance; some of these objectives require more accurate
surveillance systems than others.
Our evaluation of the performance of sentinel laboratory
groups suggests that sentinel surveillance is a viable alterna-
tive to population-based surveillance in situations where a
high degree of accuracy is not required. In some cases, sentinel
Table 4. Univariate analysis of characteristics of hospitals with a high or low %PNSP compared with hospitals with an average %PNSPa
High vs. average %PNSP  Low vs. average %PNSP
Hospital characteristic
No.
Odds ratio p value
No.
Odds ratio p value High Avg Low Avg
Adjusted inpatient daysb 0.02 0.06
   0-66,452 11 7 Refc 87 R e f
   66,453-104,771 5 11 0.29 0.09 10 11 0.80 0.73
   104,772-146,879 6 17 0.23 0.03 3 17 0.15 0.02
   >146,879 3 16 0.12 0.007 7 16 0.38 0.17
Total beds set up and staffed 0.04 0.25
   0-173 11 8 Ref 7 8 Ref
   174-300 6 11 0.40 0.18 10 11 1.04 0.96
   301-413 4 16 0.19 0.02 5 16 0.36 0.16
   >414 4 16 0.19 0.02 6 16 0.43 0.23
Adult medical/surgical and ICU beds
   0-16 15 19 Ref 17 19 Ref
   >16 7 26 0.31 0.05 9 29 0.39 0.06
Pediatric medical/surgical and ICU beds
   0-10 13 20 Ref 16 20 Ref
   >11 9 25 0.55 0.26 10 25 0.50 0.17
Hospital with a pediatric ICU
   No 18 35 Ref 22 35 Ref
   Yes 4 10 0.78 0.70 4 10 0.64 0.49
Medicaid inpatient days 0.10 0.36
   0-3,730 9 10 Ref 7 10 Ref
   3,731-8,797 7 10 0.78 9 10 1.3 0.71
   8,798-19,477 7 15 0.52 4 15 0.38 0.20
   >19,477 2 16 0.14 8 16 0.71 0.61
Medicare inpatient days 0.04 0.02
   0-18,246 10 6 Ref 10 6 Ref
   18,247-29,026 5 12 0.25 0.06 9 12 0.45 0.24
   29,027-45,471 5 18 0.17 0.01 3 18 0.10 0.005
   >45,471 5 15 0.20 0.03 6 15 0.24 0.04
Metropolitan statistical area size
   1 million population 5 10 Ref 5 10 Ref
   >l million population 20 41 0.98 0.97 23 41 1.12 0.84
aHigh %PNSP was defined as >5 percentage points above the surveillance area % of penicillin-nonsusceptible pneumococci (PNSP) ; low as >5 percentage points below the surveil-
lance area %PNSP; average as <5 percentage points above or below the surveillance area %PNSP.
bAdjusted inpatient days were calculated as Inpatient Days + (Inpatient Days * [Outpatient Revenue/Inpatient Revenue]). 
cRef=Referent group.
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surveillance may also be useful when accurate estimates of
%PNSP trends are a primary objective. Sentinel laboratory
groups were most reliable at detecting large increases or
decreases in the proportion of nonsusceptible invasive isolates;
the groups varied in their ability to predict an area’s actual
%PNSP; and they were poor at detecting newly emerging fluo-
roquinolone resistance. As a result, areas considering sentinel
surveillance should design systems and interpret data with
caution. 
Baseline information on isolates processed annually per
laboratory and between-laboratory variability in %PNSP can
be used to predict how well sentinel systems will perform at
estimating this percentage in a given area. Such information
can often be collected retrospectively or prospectively from
microbiology laboratories. Authorities in areas with high
between-laboratory variability or with few isolates per labora-
tory may want to consider alternatives or complements to sen-
tinel systems. 
Reasons for high between-laboratory variability in the pro-
portion of nonsusceptible invasive pneumococcal isolates,
such as we observed in Tennessee (Figure), remain unclear.
This variability likely reflected differences in the risk for non-
susceptible pneumococcal infections in communities served
by different laboratories. Because health insurance policies in
the United States often determine the hospitals and laborato-
ries that patients use, these facilities rarely serve populations
that are representative of the community as a whole or even
the neighborhood where the hospital is located. Characterizing
risk factors for nonsusceptible invasive pneumococcal disease
in a hospital’s patient population is difficult. Readily obtain-
able hospital characteristics such as those collected by AHA
did not explain the between-laboratory variation we observed.
Unfortunately, some known predictors of resistance in health-
care settings, such as suburban middle- and upper-class patient
populations (15,16), were not available to link to our surveil-
lance data. 
Although most basic hospital characteristics were not a
reliable guide to selecting laboratories to be included in senti-
nel systems, pediatric hospitals were significantly more likely
than other hospitals in an area to have a high %PNSP. Because
children are a primary reservoir of S. pneumoniae and the inci-
dence of invasive pneumococcal disease is elevated in children
and the elderly (1), states may sometimes choose to include
children’s hospitals in sentinel surveillance systems to increase
their likelihood of identifying resistance problems. However,
to track trends in resistance to drugs such as fluoroquinolones
that are not indicated for use in children, children’s hospitals
may not be reliable indicators.
For states wishing to increase the reliability of sentinel sys-
tems, increasing the overall number of laboratories participat-
ing in sentinel systems improved the accuracy of systems,
particularly in areas where the %PNSP approaches 50%. How-
ever, in areas with high between-laboratory variation in
%PNSP, accuracy is difficult to achieve without including
most laboratories in the system.
For states or regions with a primary objective of detecting
rare, newly emerging resistance profiles, more than one sur-
veillance approach may be necessary. For example, sentinel
surveillance combined with universal reporting of fluoroqui-
nolone- or vancomycin-resistant pneumococci will help detect
important new strains before they become widespread. Addi-
tionally, authorities in such areas may consider collecting the
isolates captured by sentinel facilities and conducting suscepti-
bility testing by using a more diverse drug panel than is typi-
cally used in most clinical microbiology laboratories.
If used and interpreted appropriately, sentinel laboratory
surveillance helps document pneumococcal resistance and
improve prevention efforts. Evaluation of alternative surveil-
lance methods such as analysis of hospital antibiograms (17)
or direct electronic reporting of susceptibility results from hos-
pital laboratories to a central network (M. Soriano-Gabarro,
unpub. data) will further contribute to identifying low-cost,
feasible methods of documenting trends in pneumococcal
resistance.
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